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Abstract
The resource curse hypothesis suggests that resource-rich countries show lower eco-
nomic growth rates compared to resource-poor countries. We add to this literature
by providing empirical evidence on a new transmission channel of the resource curse,
namely, the negative effect of rents on the quality of education. The cross-country
analysis for more than 70 countries shows a significantly positive effect of oil rents
on the quantity of education measured by government spending on primary and sec-
ondary education. Hence, the underspending hypothesis championed by Gylfason
(2001) no longer holds with newer data. However, we find a robust and negative
effect of oil rents dependency on the current objective and subjective indicators of
quality of education, controlling for a set of other drivers of education quality and
regional dummies. Despite spending significant shares of GDP on education, oil-rich
countries still suffer from an insufficient quality of primary and secondary educa-
tion, which may hamper their growth potentials. The significant negative effect of
oil rents dependency on education quality can be explained by both the demand
(e.g., skill acquisition) and supply (e.g., teacher quality) side channels.
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1. Introduction  
There is an increasing interest in understanding the development failures of resource-rich 
countries. The so-called resource curse hypothesis suggests that resource-rich countries, on 
average and in the long run, show lower economic growth rates compared to resource-poor 
countries.1 We add to this literature by providing empirical evidence on a new transmission 
channel of the resource curse, namely, the negative effect of rents on the quality of education. 
This channel of the resource curse has been largely neglected in the literature so far.  
In recent years, one of the main criteria for debt forgiveness of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries has been increased spending on education (Andrews et al., 1999). International 
organizations, such as the World Bank, are allocating significant budgets for the expansion of 
schooling in developing countries. In its 2015 annual report, the World Bank emphasized 
education as one the best ways to end poverty. The Bank’s investment in education projects is 
now more than $14 billion [World Bank (2015)]. However, larger spending on education may 
not automatically lead to a higher quality of education. In one of its recent feature stories, the 
World Bank (2016) illustrated the alarming status of education quality in 10 Francophone 
African countries despite the massive investment in education and access to schooling over the 
last 15 years. Most assessed students in these countries show significant deficits in language 
and mathematics tests.2 Another example is in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 
Middle East region, which is, on average, one of the resource-richest parts of the world, has 
increased its education expenditures in the last 20 years and is now allocating a significant share 
of government budgets to education. In the MENA region, government spending on education 
                                                          
1 We re-examine this hypothesis by regressing the degree of dependency of economy to oil rents in 1990 on the 
GDP per capita growth rates from 1990 to 2015, controlling for a couple of other growth drivers and regional 
dummies. The initial dependence on oil rents has a negative and significant effect on the long term growth rates in 
our sample, which is in line with resource curse hypothesis (see Table A1 in Appendix).  
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/03/10/education-quality-measuring-learning-outcomes-in-
francophone-africas-primary-schools 
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as a share of GDP is above the world average [(5.4% MENA vs. 4.4% world average, average 
from 1995 to 2012, World Bank (2017)]. As a share of GDP, the MENA governments spend 
even more on education than OECD countries.3 However, the monetary investment is not 
reflected in the quality of education, as noted by Kaarsen (2014), who has developed a new 
index to measure the quality of schooling across countries. He classifies the oil-exporting 
countries as outliers since – despite their relatively high income per capita – they are not 
exhibiting the existence of high-quality education. In his words: “Another group of outliers 
consists of the oil producing countries Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. In these 
countries, GDP per worker is relatively high while education quality is low” (p. 219). Kaarsen 
does not provide any evidence on the nexus between resource rents and education quality. Our 
aim is to examine this nexus in a multivariate framework and to clarify the mechanism.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the 
nexus between education and natural resource rents. Using more recent data, Section 3 presents 
a re-examination of the question whether resource-rich countries spend less on education. 
Section 4 turns to the question whether resource-rich countries generate lower educational 
qualities. Section 5 discusses the possible transmission channels, which can explain the effect 
of resource rents on education quality. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature  
Earlier studies, such as Sachs and Warner (2001), focus on the direct association between 
development and resource rents. Since then, a large body of literature has aimed at explaining 
the transmission channels of the resource curse. Why do resources generate lower growth? 
Some contributions highlight the role of institutions and governance (e.g., Mehlum et al., 2006), 
                                                          
3 We see the same impressive funding of education, when we consider its share of government total spending 
(16.3% in the MENA vs. 13.9% world average). In addition, educational spending per student at the secondary 
level (in relation to GDP per capita) is higher in the resource-rich MENA region (19.5%) than in East Asia (14.7%) 
or Latin America (13.9%). 
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while others refer to structural economic impacts of large resource rents, e.g., the Dutch disease 
(van Wijnbergen 1984). Ethnical and political fractionalizations are also examined as important 
factors in the development-rent nexus. Countries with ethnically and/or politically 
fractionalized system face more often the resource curse than homogenous countries (Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol 2005; Hodler 2006; Bjorvatn et al., 2012, 2013; Bjorvatn and Farzanegan 
2015). Using geocoded data of mines, Lessmann and Steinkraus (2017) demonstrate that spatial 
distribution of resource endowments within countries drives the curse of natural resources.  
Gylfason (2001) stresses the neglect of education as a crucial factor behind the curse of 
resources, particularly in oil-rich countries. In his cross-country regression analysis, he finds 
that key education indicators – such as public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, 
secondary enrolment, and expected years of schooling for girls – are negatively correlated with 
resource rents and that economic growth and education are positively correlated. He concludes 
that neglecting education is as important as other channels, such as rent seeking and the Dutch 
disease, in explaining the so-called resource curse. Stijns (2006) shows that the correlation 
between natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation crucially depends on the 
definition of resource abundance. In particular, subsoil wealth, which is a measure of the 
remaining resource wealth of a country, is positively correlated with human capital 
accumulation. There are also some more descriptive studies on the subject. For instance, 
Birdsall et al. (2001) use arable land per capita as a proxy for resource abundance and argue 
that the distribution of resource rents reduces the incentives to invest in education.4 
Contribution of this Paper 
Our study differs from Gylfason (2001) by emphasizing education quality as a transmission 
channel for the resource curse. Under-estimating the role of education quality may explain the 
                                                          
4 Davis (1995) sees positive effects of resource rents on schooling, as literacy rates and enrollment are higher in 
resource-rich countries than in other (developing) countries. 
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mixed results in the literature on the nexus between education spending and development. One 
group finds that government spending on education and health care can increase economic 
growth and reduce poverty (e.g., see Barro 1991; Tanzi and Chu 1998; Sylwester 2002). 
Another group highlights the important role of institutions in the final growth effects of 
education spending. Education spending may not lead to economic growth when the quality of 
economic and political institutions is weak (Pritchett 2001; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994)5. 
The two main questions that we are examining in our study are as follows: 
Q1:  Do resource-rich countries invest less in education systems, particularly at primary and 
secondary levels?  
Q2:  Does higher dependency on resource rents affect the quality of the education system 
negatively? 
With Q1, we replicate some parts of Gylfason’s analysis on the rent-spending nexus with more 
recent data. Q2 then shifts the focus to education quality. To answer these questions, we use 
data on education spending (2006-15) as well as recently published data on the (objective and 
perceived) quality of education. The resource rents and other control variables are measured as 
the average of the period 1995-2005. The cross-country analysis for more than 70 countries 
shows a significantly positive effect of oil rents on government spending on primary and 
secondary education. Hence, the underspending hypothesis championed by Gylfason (2001) no 
longer holds with newer data. However, we find a robust and negative effect of oil rents on the 
current quality of education, controlling for a set of other drivers of education quality and 
regional dummies. Despite spending significant shares of domestic GDP on education, the oil-
                                                          
5 We have also investigated the effect of education spending and education quality on the long-run economic 
growth rates in our sample of analysis, controlling for other possible drivers of growth. The results are shown in 
Appendix Tables A2 and A3. Our cross-country results support the argument of scholars who are questioning the 
effectiveness of education spending per se on long-term growth. However, we find that there is a robust positive 
effect of education quality on long-term growth, which is also in line with findings of Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2012).  
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rich countries still suffer from an insufficient quality of primary and secondary education, which 
may hamper their growth potentials. 
3. Public Spending on Education  
As a prerequisite to our key research question Q2, we re-examine the earlier hypothesis in the 
resource curse literature that resource-rich countries are under-spending in their educational 
system. We use recent data on public spending on education at primary and secondary levels. 
To answer Q1 we employ the following specification: 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where eduexp stands for the government expenditure on education, rent_gdp stands for the ratio 
of resource rents to GDP, and Z covers the set of other control variables.  
Data 
We use the (log of) PPP adjusted spending per student on both primary and secondary education 
as dependent variables.6 It is important to adjust per student spending by considering the 
purchasing power in different countries. For example, spending 500 US$ on education buys 
quite different amounts of teaching hours in Yemen and Germany.7 We use the simple average 
from 2006 to 2015.  
Our key variable of interest in explaining cross-country differences in public spending on 
education is the dependency on resource rents. In line with most of the literature on the resource 
curse, we focus on oil rents, as oil is the economically most relevant resource. Oil rents are 
defined as the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total 
costs of production. The rent-to-GDP ratio captures the relative importance of rents in a country 
                                                          
6 We are not considering the tertiary level of education in our analysis because our main focus is also on the quality 
of the educational system, which is measured up to the secondary level of schooling.  
7 As the World Bank (2017) data on education expenditures is expressed in relation to GDP per capita of a country, 
we first multiply the government expenditure per student (percentage of GDP per capita) by GDP per capita in the 
local currency of each country. The outcome is then divided by the PPP conversion factor. 
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and has been used frequently in the resource curse literature (e.g., Bjorvatn and Farzanegan 
2015; Arezki and Gylfason 2013). The oil rents data are from the World Bank (2017). This and 
other control variables are measured as the average of the period 1995-2005. This strategy helps 
us to not only reduce the risk of reverse feedback from the dependent variables (2006-2015) on 
a couple of right-hand-side variables, such as GDP but also acknowledges the time needed to 
influence the dependent variable in our model. 
In addition to oil rents, we need to control for a couple of other channels, which may affect the 
education spending per student at primary or secondary levels. In the Z vector, we control for 
the logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). If education is a normal good, rising per 
capita incomes will induce parents to demand higher investments in education. Hence, we 
expect to observe a positive association between income per capita and the quantity of 
education. We also control for population growth, as a higher growth rate in the past decade 
will increase the entry into primary and secondary schools in the current period and reduce the 
available public funds for education per student. The openness to international trade and 
investors can also influence the government spending on education. To remain an attractive 
market for international investors and traders, an economy should be able to provide facilities 
and infrastructure for human capital formation. Thus, we control for trade (as a percentage of 
GDP) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (as a percentage of GDP). The source of data for the 
control variables is the World Bank (2017).  
In addition to these economic and demographic controls, we have also included an indicator for 
the quality of economic and political institutions. Following Mehlum et al. (2006), we use an 
unweighted average of six dimensions of institutional quality based on the data from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is published by the Political Risk Service 
Group. These dimensions are ‘law and order’ (from 0 to 6, where a higher number indicates 
better institutions), ‘democratic accountability’ (from 0 to 6), ‘political corruption’ (0 to 6), 
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‘internal conflict’ (from 0 to 12), ‘bureaucracy quality’ (0 to 4), and ‘investment profile’ (from 
0 to 12). Higher scores of the index imply a better quality of economic and political institutions. 
In their theoretical and empirical analysis, Dizaji et al. (2016) show that positive developments 
in the quality of democratic institutions go along with a more generous allocation of resources 
to education and with lower military spending. Corruption together with a weaker rule of law 
distorts the allocation of public budgets; public funds are channeled to areas that have higher 
return from bribes and lower risks of detection. These are mostly capital-intensive projects 
rather than education or health (see Mauro 1997; Gupta et al. 2001; Blackburn and Sarmah 
2008). Internal risk of conflict may also change the priority of the government for budget 
allocation – away from education toward military spending.  
Furthermore, we also control for regional dummies, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia. These regional dummies 
control for the region-specific factors, which affect public spending on education such as the 
values and attitudes of the people toward education.  
Results 
The results are presented in Table 1. Models 1.1 to 1.7 show the effects of oil rents dependency 
and other control variables on (the logarithm of) public spending per student in secondary 
education (PPP adjusted). We follow a specific to general approach by adding control variables 
to the initial specification. Models 1.8 to 1.14 use the logarithm of public spending on each 
student in primary education. We have no empirical evidence on the under-spending of 
governments in oil-rich countries for primary and secondary education. Quite the opposite: 
there is a positive and statistically significant effect of higher oil rents (for the period of 1995-
2005) on the education spending per student in primary and secondary education (in the period 
2006-2015) in the majority of the models. The size of the effect of oil rents is stronger for the 
case of spending on the secondary level of schooling. For example, in Model 1.7, an increase 
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in the share of oil rents in GDP by one standard deviation (12.7% between 1995-2005) increases 
government spending per student in secondary school by 0.12 standard deviation between 2006-
2015. In Model 1.14, a similar increase in oil rents leads to an increase of government spending 
per student at the primary level by 0.08 standard deviation. Another way of expressing the size 
of the relationship between oil rents and government spending per student is through an 
adjusted-squared partial correlation (the so-called partial omega squared). It adjusts for the 
number of predictors of education spending in our models, giving a more accurate 
representation of the population value. In the general model 1.7, the omega-squared for the 
entire model is 89.3%. Oil rents explain 6.7% of the variance in public spending per student at 
the secondary level. GDP per capita explains 52.7%. The second most important variable is 
population growth, which explains 7.1% of the variance. Oil rents are the third most important 
variable in explaining that the government spending on students and its effects is more relevant 
for explaining secondary school expenditures.8  
As expected, the logarithm of GDP per capita shows a robust and statistically significant effect 
on public education spending per student in all models. Higher population growth shows a 
negative effect on education spending per student at both the primary and the secondary levels. 
A larger population burden will not only increase the entry rates into schools but also put 
additional pressures on the government’s limited budget for other categories such as health. 
Quality of institutions shows a positive association with government education spending per 
student but this positive association is statistically significant only for the case of predicting the 
spending on students at the secondary level of education (Models 1.3, 1.4, and 1.6).9 Both 
                                                          
8 In Model 1.4, the omega-squared for the entire model is 91.7%. Oil rents explain 3.1% of the variance of 
government spending per students at primary levels while the most important explanatory variable is GDP per 
capita (59%), followed by population growth rate (8%). 
9 This lack of statistical significance may be due to the correlation between GDP per capita and the quality of 
institutions in our sample (correlation coefficient of 0.78). For example, if we omit the GDP per capita in Model 
1.7, the positive effect of institutions becomes significant at the 99% confidence interval (CI), and its coefficient 
increases from 0.168 to 0.868. It also increases the statistical significance of oil rents from 95% CI to 99% CI and 
its size from 0.02 to 0.05. By omitting the GDP per capita in Model 1.14, the positive effect of institutions on 
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openness to international trade and investment are important predictors of government spending 
on education. Being exposed to global markets (intensity of imports and exports) and to 
international investors may increase the rate of return for education in a country. Open and 
competitive economies look for skilled manpower, sending strong signals to the government of 
the need for spending on education. 
Our investigation shows that earlier findings in the resource curse literature (e.g., Gylfason, 
2001) that resource-rich countries are under-spending in their educational system are no longer 
present when using recent data. This, however, does not imply that the resource curse has 
vanished. The interesting question now is whether the high public spending on education at 
primary and secondary levels in oil-rich countries translates into a high quality of education.  
 
 
                                                          
public spending per students at the primary level becomes statistically significant at 99% CI. In addition, the 
coefficient for political and economic institutions shows a significant increase from 0.10 to 0.81. In other words, 
inclusion of income per capita absorbs the significant effect of institutional quality on the public spending per 
student. Inclusion or exclusion of income per capita, however, has no significant effect on the influence of oil rents 
on public education spending. To check the extent of multicollinearity, we have examined the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) in our general models of 1.7 and 1.14. The mean VIF is 3.02 in Model 1.7 and 3.08 in Model 1.14. 
As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further investigation. None of our 
variables in general models have VIF values larger than 10.  
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Table 1. Resource rents and government spending per student at the primary and secondary levels 
 
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.10) (1.11) (1.12) (1.13) (1.14) 
 log_ppp_spending_secondary student 2006_15 log_ppp_spending_primary_student 2006_15 
oil rent (% GDP) -0.001 0.004 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020** -0.001 0.008** 0.014** 0.016** 0.014* 0.016** 0.012* 
 (-0.37) (0.75) (2.72) (3.18) (2.75) (3.05) (2.30) (-0.18) (2.28) (2.00) (2.30) (1.82) (2.06) (1.80) 
log GDP per capita 0.777*** 0.754*** 0.606*** 0.570*** 0.628*** 0.588*** 0.649*** 0.814*** 0.770*** 0.714*** 0.683*** 0.711*** 0.675*** 0.646*** 
 (22.92) (22.51) (7.57) (7.71) (6.84) (6.86) (6.96) (25.39) (26.35) (12.32) (13.59) (11.16) (12.35) (10.33) 
population growth  -0.127*** -0.140*** -0.115** -0.161*** -0.134*** -0.163**  -0.224*** -0.217*** -0.194*** -0.224*** -0.204*** -0.154*** 
  (-3.28) (-2.67) (-2.40) (-3.02) (-2.69) (-2.28)  (-5.80) (-4.58) (-4.32) (-4.57) (-4.39) (-2.76) 
ICRG institutional quality   0.221* 0.277** 0.162 0.238** 0.168   0.081 0.143 0.063 0.138 0.103 
   (1.80) (2.63) (1.23) (2.08) (1.25)   (0.75) (1.60) (0.57) (1.50) (0.97) 
FDI (% GDP)    0.015***  0.004 0.002    0.005  -0.006 -0.004 
    (3.51)  (0.58) (0.24)    (1.35)  (-1.08) (-0.49) 
trade (% GDP)     0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**     0.001** 0.002** 0.002 
     (3.25) (2.32) (2.13)     (2.18) (2.19) (1.65) 
Sub-Sahara       0.187       -0.481*** 
       (0.84)       (-2.69) 
Latin       -0.265       -0.242* 
       (-1.47)       (-1.67) 
East Asia       -0.191       -0.056 
       (-1.11)       (-0.28) 
EU & Central Asia       -0.071       -0.005 
       (-0.34)       (-0.03) 
Countries 104 104 94 93 93 92 92 104 104 94 93 93 92 92 
R-sq 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.93 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals. All explanatory variables are averages of 1995-2005.
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4. The Quality of Education  
Our second question aims at examining the effectiveness of government spending on primary 
and secondary education in oil-rich countries compared to other countries. Can we trace a 
higher quality of education in oil-rich economies? To answer Q2, we use the following 
specification: 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (2) 
Data 
In Eq. (2), our dependent variable measures the quality of education. We use two different 
indicators – one measure of objective quality and one of perceived quality. Our main proxy to 
measure quality is a new (objective) index introduced by Kaarsen (2014). In his study on “cross-
country differences in the quality of schooling”, education quality is defined as the “increase in 
cognitive skills obtained from an additional year of schooling”. He converts the Trends in Math 
and Science Study (TIMSS) test scores to an index of education quality.10 His index captures 
“the effectiveness of one year of schooling in country i relative to one year of schooling in the 
U.S.”. The lowest education quality score in our sample is for Yemen with 0.250, and the 
highest one is for Singapore with 1.363. This index complements the traditional measures of 
quantity of schooling by the quality of learning, allowing for a more comprehensive view of 
the potential of human capital formation in a country. Note that the Kaarsen index captures the 
effectiveness of an education system as it measures the annual progress of students in key 
competencies. In contrast, the commonly used literacy rates just capture a necessary but by no 
means sufficient competency for acquiring human capital in a modern economy. In addition, 
                                                          
10 Kaarsen (2014) uses data from various TIMSS rounds from 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. Some countries 
such as the United States have participated in all rounds and some others only in a few of them. The downside of 
using this data is that we cannot conduct a panel-data analysis, as the Kaarsen index is available only as a cross 
section. 
13 
 
alternative measures such as enrollment ratios or completion rates capture education de jure but 
not de facto as the large variation in Kaarsen’s data impressively shows.  
In addition to the objective measure of education quality (Kaarsen, 2014) and for robustness 
checks, we also use the perceived quality of education systems from the Global 
Competitiveness Reports of the World Economic Forum (WEF).11 The subjective measure of 
perceived quality is based on information gathered through executive opinion surveys. Several 
questions address the quality of education across countries. We use the following survey 
question: “How well does the educational system in your country meet the needs of a 
competitive economy?” The scores are from 1 (not well at all) to 7 (very well). These data are 
available from 2006 to 2014. We take the average of the scores for this question from 2006-
2014 as a dependent variable. This alternative index of education quality will reflect the opinion 
of executives on the effectiveness of the education system in fulfilling the job market demands.  
What are the determinants of cross-country differences in education quality? In addition to the 
resource rents dependency and other controls used in Section 3, we consider a set of additional 
variables that might affect the incentives to acquire or provide a high quality of education: 
Youth unemployment rate: Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force aged 15-
24 without work but available for and seeking employment. Higher levels of youth 
unemployment in an economy can send negative signals to both parents and children about the 
economic values of demanding high quality education.  
Logarithm of government spending on each student in primary (and secondary) education (PPP 
adjusted): The budgets for primary and secondary education (per student) may matter for the 
quality of educational infrastructure. We have focused on primary and secondary spending 
since the Kaarsen education quality is based on the performance of students at these levels of 
                                                          
11 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/  
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education (rather than tertiary education). When we use the WEF education quality (perception 
based on business managers’ opinion on quality of overall education system), we use the total 
public spending on education (percentage of GDP). We expect to observe a positive association 
between education spending per student and the quality of education.  
Student to teacher ratio at primary and secondary levels of education: A high ratio means that 
less teaching and supervising capacity is available per student. Particularly with very large 
classes, this may reduce the quality of learning. Classes with many students are not a fertile 
environment for significant interaction, practice and effective learning. However, there is little 
evidence on the significant negative effect of class size on the educational performance of 
students (Colclough, 1982). Some studies such as Woessmann and West (2006) have found 
mixed effects of class size on education quality. They argue that the effect depends on the 
institutional details of the school system and differs across countries. Therefore, the effect of 
this variable on education quality is ambiguous.  
Quality of institutions: The quality of economic and political institutions may affect the 
incentives of families and children for effective participation in the educational system. Good 
institutions provide an incentive to acquire soft skills and knowledge for future careers. Better 
quality of political institutions may also improve education quality through the free flow of 
information, the improvement in the content of textbooks, reflecting the real needs of society 
rather than ideologically or politically motivated topics in schools.  
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Results on the Objective Measure of Education Quality 
The results for the determinants of education quality across countries – based on the Kaarsen 
measure – are shown in Table 2. We examine how the past degree of economic dependence on 
oil rents affects the quality of education. We follow a specific to general approach, in which oil 
rents in Model 2.1 are the only explanatory variable of education quality. In Models 2.2 to 2.9, 
we add other possible determinants of education quality. Model 2.9 is the general specification 
where we have included a full set of other controls and regional dummies.  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) for Model 2.9 indicates some concerns on possible 
multicollineirty between government spending per student at the primary and secondary levels 
and GDP per capita.12 In Model 2.10, we address the multicollineirty concern by excluding 
insignificant spending per student (at the primary and secondary levels). This leads to a 
reduction of the VIF for each of the included variables below the critical level of 10. We also 
exclude the statistically insignificant drivers of education quality in Model 2.11.  
In all models (2.1-2.11), we observe a consistent negative and statistically significant effect of 
oil rents on education quality.13 This negative effect is robust to inclusion of other control 
variables. It shows that dependency on oil rents has a dampening effect on education quality 
reflected in the performance of students at (lower) secondary levels on international 
mathematics and science tests. We will discuss the possible channels for this “resource curse” 
effect in Section 5 in detail. 
                                                          
12 The mean VIF for Model 2.9 is under the critical level of 10 (8.97). However, the VIF for the logarithm of 
government spending per student at the secondary level and at the primary level and the logarithm of GDP per 
capita show VIF of above 10 (24.35, 41.10, and 18.53, respectively).  
13 With the exception of Model 2.8, where oil rents are marginally significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.106). 
By excluding the insignificant t variable of spending per student at the primary level and addressing 
multicollinearity, the statistical significant of oil rents in Model 2.8 increases (p-value of 0.08).  
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In general, openness to international trade and investment do not show a robust and significant 
effect on education quality in our analysis sample. In addition, youth unemployment shows no 
effect on our objective measure of education quality. 
The spending on primary education per student shows a positive effect on education quality, 
which fits the general finding in Colclough’s (1982, 167) review article: “Investment strategies 
that give primary schooling an important place would be more conducive of growth-with-equity 
than many alternatives”. However, this positive effect is statistically significant only in Model 
2.6. 
The negative effect of spending per student at the secondary level on education quality is against 
our initial expectation. This negative effect may be due to inefficiencies in government 
spending. The inefficiency of public education spending in oil-rich countries is mentioned in 
the World Bank study by Le et al. (2010), suggesting that “public expenditure efficiency is 
lower in oil-rich countries compared with other developing countries”. They argue that this 
efficiency deficit is mainly due to “differences in accountability to citizens of government’s 
spending decisions”. Countries with higher quality of institutions, on average, enjoy a higher 
degree of transparency in fiscal issues, e.g., addressing public corruption in educational projects 
more effectively.14 Nevertheless, the variance inflation factor raises concerns of 
multicollinearity when we include government education spending per students at both the 
primary and the secondary levels. When we drop spending per student at the primary level, the 
negative effect of spending at the secondary level on education quality loses its significance. 
The ratio of students to teachers in primary and secondary education shows no significant effect 
on education quality. This is in line with the mixed evidence in studies for OECD countries 
                                                          
14 The importance of some dimensions of governance such as corruption and the black market premium on foreign 
exchange (as a proxy for rent seeking) for productive use of schooling and effectiveness of education spending are 
examined by Rogers (2008). 
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with more elaborated identification strategies (see, e.g., Altinok and Kingdon 2012 or 
Woessmann and West 2006).  
The effect of economic and political institutions on education quality is captured through the 
effect of income per capita. In other words, when we exclude income per capita, the positive 
effect of institutional quality becomes statistically significant at 95% CI.  
For the regional dummies, the Sub-Saharan and Latin American regions show a negative effect 
on education quality. The negative effect of the Sub-Sahara regional dummy on education 
quality is in line with earlier findings of other studies such as Glewwe et al. (2014). They show 
that the growth effects of education in Sub-Sahara are lower than in other regions, “likely due 
to lower school quality”. By contrast, the regional dummies of East Asia as well as Europe and 
Central Asia show a positive and significant effect of education quality.  
In the general model of 2.10, the omega-squared for the entire model is 66%. Oil rents explain 
10% of the variance in education quality; GDP per capita explains 9.5%. 
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Table 2. Oil rents and the quality of education (Kaarsen Index) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) (2.9) (2.10) (2.11) 
 quality_education_kaarsen_1995_2011 
oil rents (% GDP) -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.010 -0.010* -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.31) (-5.02) (-4.77) (-4.51) (-4.56) (-4.66) (-2.80) (-1.66) (-1.94) (-3.68) (-3.79) 
log GDP per capita  0.113*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.068 0.096 0.086 0.019 0.078*** 0.085*** 
  (6.88) (6.86) (6.71) (5.40) (0.86) (0.91) (0.88) (0.21) (2.90) (5.89) 
trade (% GDP)   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001  
   (1.36) (1.33) (1.24) (1.62) (1.04) (1.12) (0.01) (1.36)  
FDI (% GDP)    -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007** -0.001 -0.006*  
    (-0.13) (-0.13) (-1.60) (-1.66) (-2.26) (-0.29) (-1.89)  
youth unemployment     -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001  
     (-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.88) (-0.56) (-0.28) (0.67)  
log PPP spending per secondary stud.      -0.163* -0.236** -0.259*** -0.126   
      (-1.79) (-2.33) (-2.73) (-1.26)   
log PPP spending per primary  stud.      0.266** 0.230 0.220 0.236   
      (2.08) (0.97) (0.93) (1.23)   
stud_teacher secondary       -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007  
       (-0.97) (-1.17) (-0.80) (-0.79)  
stud_teacher primary       -0.004 -0.002 0.008 0.004  
       (-0.32) (-0.20) (0.68) (0.51)  
ICRG institutional quality        0.068 -0.002 0.033  
        (1.35) (-0.03) (0.82)  
Sub-Sahara         -0.279** -0.301*** -0.253*** 
         (-2.40) (-3.90) (-4.03) 
Latin         -0.136 -0.059 -0.110*** 
         (-1.06) (-0.63) (-2.76) 
East Asia & Pacific         0.150 0.187 0.225** 
         (1.27) (1.67) (2.62) 
EU & Central Asia         0.170* 0.162** 0.215*** 
         (1.92) (2.39) (4.82) 
Countries 73 72 72 72 72 51 46 46 46 61 72 
R-sq 0.17 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.76 0.73 0.70 
Robust t statistics are in parenthesis. Independent variables (except for regional dummies) are average values from 1990 to 2000. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals. All 
explanatory variables are averages of 1995-2005. 
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Results on the Subjective Measure of Education Quality 
We also examine our hypothesis about the negative effect of oil rents on the quality of education 
by using the subjective index of WEF, which is based on the perception of overall education 
quality by business executives. Executives have contacts with job seekers and, therefore, may 
be able to judge the hard and soft skills of the young generation.  
Table 3 shows the results using the WEF index of education quality, averaged from 2006 to 
2015. The explanatory variables are average values from 1995 to 2005. We include similar 
control variables as in the previous case. Using the subjective index of education quality does 
not change our earlier results. Countries with higher dependency on oil rents show a lower 
education quality as perceived by business executives. The negative association of oil rents with 
education quality is not sensible to the addition of other control variables.  
The education quality of richer countries – based on real GDP per capita – is also perceived to 
be higher. Countries that are more integrated in global trade show higher perceived education 
quality as well. In contrast to our earlier results, there is a significant negative effect of past 
youth unemployment rates on the perceived quality of education by business managers. Higher 
youth unemployment may be interpreted as a signal for a dysfunctional education system by 
the business executives. There is a positive and statistically significant effect of spending per 
student at the secondary level on the perceived quality of education by job providers in business. 
In Model 2.10, we exclude spending per student at the primary and secondary levels since their 
existence in the specification shows a high VIF factor, raising concerns of multicollinearity. 
Excluding spending reduces the VIF factor significantly. We do not observe any significant 
effect from the ICRG institutional quality index on the education quality. Model 3.11 is a 
specification, which addresses possible multicollinearity and contains the most significant 
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variables of earlier models. It explains 64% of the cross-country variation in the quality of 
education perceptions in our sample.15  
                                                          
15 Note that only a fraction of the 123 countries in Model 3.1 have significant oil rents. Eighty-four countries have non-zero oil rents, and 37 
countries exhibit oil-rents-to-GDP ratios of more than 1%.  
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Table 3. Oil rents and the quality of education (WEF Index) 
 
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.10) (3.11) 
 WEF_quality_education 2006_2015 
oil rent (% GDP) -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.019 -0.033** -0.035*** -0.030*** 
 (-2.91) (-4.41) (-4.20) (-4.20) (-4.32) (-3.05) (-3.75) (-1.42) (-2.34) (-3.80) (-5.23) 
log GDP pc  0.399*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.376*** 0.052 0.119 0.008 0.248 0.349*** 0.364*** 
  (9.75) (9.12) (9.08) (9.54) (0.28) (0.62) (0.04) (1.27) (3.28) (10.42) 
trade (% GDP)   0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002* 
   (2.86) (2.18) (2.08) (1.31) (1.82) (1.45) (1.63) (1.62) (1.97) 
FDI (% GDP)    0.005 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.000  
    (0.59) (0.44) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (-0.39) (0.03)  
youth unemployment     -0.019*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
     (-3.77) (-4.44) (-3.65) (-2.85) (-2.85) (-3.01) (-4.38) 
log PPP spending per secondary stud.      0.605*** 0.852*** 0.950*** 0.656**   
      (3.77) (3.55) (4.24) (2.02)   
log PPP spending per primary  stud.      -0.126 -0.429 -0.598* -0.575*   
      (-0.51) (-1.34) (-1.84) (-1.79)   
stud_teacher secondary       0.043** 0.055*** 0.047** 0.009  
       (2.12) (2.92) (2.42) (0.59)  
stud_teacher primary       -0.016 -0.026* -0.021 -0.010  
       (-1.06) (-1.77) (-1.37) (-0.82)  
ICRG institutional quality        0.293 0.199 -0.008  
        (1.50) (0.84) (-0.06)  
Sub-Sahara         -0.314 -0.012  
         (-0.67) (-0.04)  
Latin         -0.754*** -1.023*** -0.771*** 
         (-2.70) (-5.17) (-5.26) 
East Asia & Pacific         -0.352 -0.209  
         (-1.18) (-0.90)  
EU & Central Asia         -0.302 -0.399*  
         (-1.10) (-1.98)  
Obs. 124 123 122 122 122 79 74 67 67 96 122 
R-sq 0.06 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.64 
Robust t statistics are in parenthesis. Independent variables are average values from 1995 to 2005. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.  
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Robustness checks 
Using an international database on human capital quality 
For a robustness check, we also re-estimate our previous specifications by using an alternative 
indicator of human capital introduced and calculated by Altinok and Murseli (2007). In 
comparison with earlier studies such as Lee and Barro (2001) or Hanushek and Kimko (2000), 
their index covers a larger number of countries from different income groups while the earlier 
studies are often focused on high income countries. Altinok and Murseli (2007) use eight 
international surveys on children's learning achievement, focusing on the most recent data 
(post-1995) and on the quality of education at the secondary level of schooling (grade 8). In 
particular, they examine the performance of students at grade 8 in mathematics, science and 
reading. All surveys are adjusted to a scale from 0 to 100 (maximum performance score).  
In our robustness test, we replace the Kaarsen education quality index with the Altinok and 
Murseli index of average student performance in the three dimensions. The results are presented 
in Table A4 in the Appendix. The results show a consistent negative and statistically robust 
effect of oil rents dependency on the average quality of education, controlling for other 
determinants of education quality. GDP per capita and the regional dummies for the Sub-
Sahara, Latin America and East Asia and Pacific are often significant drivers of education 
quality. Class sizes in primary and secondary schools and government spending per student at 
the primary and secondary levels do not show a significant effect. In some models, trade 
openness shows a positive and statistically significant impact on the overall quality of the 
education system. Model 11, which keeps the most relevant variables, explains more than 80% 
of cross country differences in the overall quality of the educational system in our sample.16 
Influential observation and outlier tests 
To what extent are our main results, which were obtained using the Kaarsen and WEF indicators 
of education quality, driven by influential observations? Are our main results robust after 
addressing possible influential observations? For example, we re-examine Model 2.10 from 
Table 2. The lvr2plot is used to create a graph plotting the leverage versus the squared residuals 
(Figure 1).  
                                                          
16 We have also used the average test score in math and science (primary through the end of secondary school, all 
years, 1964-2003), which is used in Hanushek and Woessmann (2012), as our index of education quality. The 
negative effect of oil rents remains robust in most specifications (in 7 of 11 models).  
23 
 
Figure 1. Leverage versus squared residuals in Model 2.11 
 
Countries 171 (Singapore) and 104 (Korea, Rep.) have either high leverage or large residuals. 
Next, we calculate Cook’s D and identify the observations with relatively large values of 
Cook’s D. One conventional cut-off value for Cook’ D is 4/n, where n is the number of 
observations in the estimated model (n=61 in Model 2.10). A few countries have Cook’s D 
larger than the cut-off value of 4/61= 0.06. These are countries 91 (Iran with Cook’s D of 0.12), 
98 (Japan with Cook’s D of 0.10), 104 (Korea with Cook’s D of 0.21), 124 (Malta with Cook’s 
D of 0.41), 142 (New Zealand with Cook’s D of 0.92), 155 (the Philippines with Cook’s D of 
0.14), 161 (Russia with Cook’s D of 0.09) and 171 (Singapore with Cook’s D of 0.41). Since 
none of these countries have Cook’s D larger than 1, the robust regression analysis will not 
exclude them from estimations by assigning the missing weight to them. The robust regression 
gives different weights to each observation depending on how well-behaved the observations 
are.17 We presented the results of the robust regression in Table A5 in the Appendix. The robust 
regression estimation, which addresses observations with high leverage or residual, is consistent 
with the OLS estimation of Model 2.10. It confirms our earlier findings on the negative and 
significant effect of oil rents on education quality.  
                                                          
17 For more details on robust regressions, see http://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/dae/robust-regression/  
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We also examine the WEF education quality estimations of Table 3 for possible outliers or 
influential observations using the abovementioned procedure. Countries that have Cook’s D 
larger than the cut-off value of (4/96=0.04) in Model 3.10 (as an example) are South Africa, 
Mongolia, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Malta. However, none of these countries have Cook’s 
D of larger than 1. The results of the robust regression for Model 3.10 are shown in Table A6. 
Here, the estimations of the robust regression also confirm our earlier results on the negative 
and statistically significant effect of oil rents on the subjective index of education quality.  
5. Transmission Channels 
Why do we observe such a robust and negative association between oil rents dependency and 
education quality across countries? Demand-side as well as supply-side channels may explain 
the nexus.  
Demand for high-quality education 
The demand for high-quality education may be low in resource-rich economies simply because 
parents are less reluctant in accepting low quality schools. This might be the case when 
disadvantages of poor education are cushioned by the redistribution of resource rents. If this 
were the case, we should observe parents being less worried about their children’s education in 
resource-rich economies. The World Value Survey (wave 6, 2010-2014)18 contains the question 
“To what degree are you worried about the following situations? Not being able to give my 
children a good education. 1 = very much … 4 = not at all”. As parents might be more 
concerned about insufficient education when the school system is working poorly, we control 
for educational quality and income per capita: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊_𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞_𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒_𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟_𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (3) 
As dependent variables, we use the percentage of parents who have shown very much or a great 
deal of worry about the provision of good education for their children. If 𝛽𝛽1 is negative and 
significant, parents in oil-rich countries care less for a given quality of the school system and 
for a given income per capita. We estimate Eq. (3) with OLS and robust standard errors. The 
estimated effect of oil rents (𝛽𝛽1) is positive (0.47) with robust t statistics of 2.06 (significant at 
95% CI). Hence, parents in oil-rich countries are more worried (not less) about the quality of 
                                                          
18 World Values Survey (Wave 6 2010-2014) Official aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org).  
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the education of their children. The low quality of education requires explanations other than 
parents’ attitudes or norms. 
A straightforward explanation for lower human capital formation in resource-rich economies 
might be the Dutch disease, which leads to an increase in the size of the non-tradable sector. 
The non-tradable sector employs less skilled labor and does not require high levels of human 
capital.19 However, university enrollment in resource-rich economies is often above the world 
average, which suggests that the overall demand for high-quality education is not distorted 
downwards by the large sector of non-tradables. 
Another explanation focuses on the public sector. The public sector in resource-rich countries 
plays an important role for the employment of graduates while private businesses are 
marginalized in rent-based economies (Farzanegan, 2014). Studies show that public sector 
employment is used by governments as a redistributive tool and mostly for patronage purposes, 
increasing their chances of re-election (Alesina et al., 1998; Auty, 2001; Robinson et al., 2006) 
or buying political stability (Bjorvatn and Farzanegan, 2015). In the Gulf countries, over 60% 
of the national labor force is employed in the public sector; in Kuwait and Qatar, this number 
is even close to 90% (Baldwin-Edwards, 2011). Given the patronage purposes of public 
employment, particularly in oil-rich countries, these jobs are often entirely unproductive 
(Bjorvatn and Farzanegan, 2013). Although the government de jure may set a certain 
qualification as a prerequisite for entering public employment, the jobs de facto do not require 
a high-quality education. In such a situation, the demand side for educational quality is 
distorted. In a recent study, Ebeke et al. (2015) show that, when institutions are weak, resource 
abundance (oil) leads to a misallocation of talent. A larger share of students opt for professions 
with access to rents (business, law). They explain enrollment in law, business and social 
sciences with oil rents (as a percentage of GDP) and institutional quality (governance). They 
also control for the interaction between oil and governance. The misallocation of talent in 
tertiary education may be one important reason for the inferior growth performance in resource-
rich economies.20  
The explanations we have discussed so far focus mostly on tertiary education. However, the 
effect of resources on the low quality of schooling, which we are interested in, can hardly be 
explained by the distortion of talent at the university level. The low quality of education might 
emerge, if pupils put less effort into schooling because they anticipate that hard skills will not 
                                                          
19 Because of this effect, the literature suggests that higher resource rents can reduce the income gap between the 
rich and the poor in the short term (Howie and Atakhanova, 2014; Goderis and Malone, 2011). 
20 Farzanegan (2014) also shows that rent dependency leads to a low prevalence of entrepreneurship. 
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be needed later in life, e.g., when studying business or law. The insufficient incentive for high 
learning efforts is further exacerbated by labor market regulations. Several oil-rich countries 
have implemented nationalization policies requiring firms to fulfill a fixed quota of domestic 
employees. For instance, the Nitaqat program in Saudi Arabia aims at increasing the number of 
Saudis employed in the private sector by sanctioning firms that do not fulfill the quota 
(Koyame-Marsh 2016). In addition, the U.A.E. have implemented an Emiratization program, 
which has increased employment of domestic workers, but it has also led to ghost employees 
who are on the payroll without delivering any productive services. Al Riyami et al. (2015) 
estimate that in the U.A.E., “over 80% of nationals currently employed in the private sector are 
considered ghost employees”. As ghost employment is not linked to human capital, there is 
little incentive to excel in educational tournaments.  
Evidence for the incentive hypothesis is also provided by the huge gender gap in international 
examinations such as Trends in Mathematics and Sciences Study (TIMSS). In the Gulf 
countries, girls outperform boys in mathematics and science tests by much more than in other 
countries (Dyer and Kherfi, 2016). While there is little incentive for boys to acquire math and 
science skills (see above), girls benefit to some extent from higher skills both in the labor market 
and in the marriage market. “[E]ducation for women is an investment toward both direct 
earnings and finding a partner with better job opportunities” (Sayre and Hendy 2016, 73). 
Supply of high-quality education 
The low quality of education in resource-rich economies could also be driven by supply-side 
factors. A crucial determinant of educational output is teacher quality. In oil-rich economies, 
the personnel in educational institutions are often hired in international labor markets. 
Becoming a teacher is not among the most prestigious jobs in oil-based economies. According 
to Ridge et al. (2015), the educational system in oil-rich countries in the MENA region has been 
unable to attract the domestic high-skilled teachers, relying more heavily on migrant 
teachers. Therefore, a significant fraction of the teaching staff consists of foreigners who are 
employed on fixed-term contracts. For example, 90% of teachers in boys’ public schools in the 
UAE were expatriate Arabs as of 2010-2011. Similar numbers are reported for the case of Qatar: 
the share of Arab migrant teachers in public schools was approximately 90% in 2013 (Ridge et 
al., 2015). In contrast to permanent teaching staff that is rooted in the local community, the 
incentives for long-term development of educational quality are clearly lower for migrant 
teachers with fixed-term contracts. Ridge (2010) shows that the majority of male teachers in 
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UAE are mostly from Syria, Egypt and Jordan, where “[a]s in most Arab countries, teachers 
tend to be from the lower end of the graduating cohort” [Ridge (2010, 28)]. In contrast to 
Emirati teachers, the expatriates receive lower wages, have limited contracts (one year) and 
have very limited training and promotion opportunities. Things are different with female 
teachers. In girls’ schools, 70-100% of the (female) teachers are Emiratis. The higher quality 
of teachers and their long-term perspective when teaching a class pays off. As mentioned 
earlier, girls outperform by far their male counterparts, particularly in math and science.  
6. Conclusion 
We investigated a new transmission channel of the oil curse: education quality (overall and at 
the lower secondary levels of education). Using updated data on different measures of public 
spending on education, we show that oil-rich economies are not under-spending in their 
educational system. However, our results show that higher spending on education (in particular, 
at the primary and secondary levels per student) has not translated into higher (objective and 
subjective) measures of education quality. Our results are based on a cross-country analysis of 
more than 70 countries for the period of 1995-2015. In addition to oil rents as our key predictor 
of education quality, we also control for other drivers of education quality, such as income per 
capita, economic globalization of countries, the amounts of allocated budgets at different levels 
of schooling, the class size, quality of political and economic institutions and a set of regional 
dummies. Our findings are robust to different specifications as well as different measures of 
education quality. The significant negative effect of oil rents dependency on education quality 
can be explained by both the demand and supply side channels. On the demand side, we refer 
to the effects of the Dutch disease on the allocation of resources, the redistribution of rents 
through unproductive jobs in the public sector and the Emiratization programs generating ghost 
employment. On the supply side, we note the insufficient incentives of migrant teachers to 
provide high-quality education.  
Future research will have to be devoted to identifying causal links between resource rents and 
educational quality. We have discussed some supply and demand factors that may be crucial 
for the inefficient accumulation of human capital in resource-rich countries. Due to the lack of 
data in this field, we were not able to disentangle the different effects. Quasi-natural 
experiments, e.g., created by some educational reform, as well as case studies of single 
countries may be helpful in removing the bottlenecks in producing high educational quality in 
oil-rich economies. 
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Appendix 
A. Resource curse in our sample of analysis  
The resource curse hypothesis states that countries that are more dependent on resource rents 
(in most cases, this is oil) experience lower economic growth rates in the long term compared 
to countries with lower initial dependency on rents. To (re-)test this hypothesis, we consider 
the effects of oil rents dependency in 1990 on GDP per capita growth rates from 1990 to 2015, 
controlling for other possible drivers of growth in 1990. These control variables are trade 
openness ([import+ exports]/GDP); foreign aid (percentage of GNI); domestic capital 
formation (percentage of GDP) as a proxy for the domestic investment rate; foreign direct 
investment (FDI, percentage of GDP); the fertility rate and a dummy for the East Asian and 
Pacific region.21 All variables are from the World Bank (2017).  
We follow a specific to general approach in our specification, starting in Model 1 with oil rents 
only. There is a negative and significant effect of oil rents in 1990 on the long run growth rates, 
supporting the resource curse hypothesis. Only in Model 7, when also controlling for fertility, 
the negative significance of oil rents vanishes. However, the statistical significance of oil rents 
in growth returns in Model 8 where we exclude the insignificant variables of Model 7.  
                                                          
21 Other regional dummies turn out to be insignificant when included. 
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Table A1. The resource curse: oil rents and long run growth rates across countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 GDP per capita growth rate (1990-2015) 
oil rent (% GDP) 1990 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.029** -0.025* -0.024* -0.004 -0.028* 
 (-2.85) (-2.65) (-3.39) (-2.08) (-1.81) (-1.77) (-0.21) (-1.77) 
trade (% GDP) 1990  0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006* -0.009** -0.001 
  (0.37) (-0.41) (-0.92) (-1.20) (-1.75) (-2.63) (-0.32) 
aid (% GNI) 1990   -0.034 -0.016 -0.016 -0.002 0.040  
   (-1.08) (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.09) (1.44)  
investment (% GDP) 1990    0.068** 0.064* 0.033 0.013  
    (2.29) (1.94) (1.39) (0.56)  
FDI (% GDP) 1990     0.051 0.024 0.058** 0.021 
     (1.04) (0.81) (2.11) (0.91) 
fertility 1990       -0.425*** 0.001 
       (-2.73) (0.01) 
East Asia & Pacific      2.186*** 2.028*** 1.678** 
      (2.72) (2.72) (2.22) 
Obs. 116 109 72 71 66 66 66 92 
R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.43 0.18 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.  
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B. Long run growth, education spending and education quality  
We investigate the effects of government spending on education and of education quality [using 
the measure by Kaarsen (2014)] on long-run growth (Table A.2). There is a positive effect of 
education quality and a negative effect of education spending on growth.  
 
Table A2. Education spending, education quality and long run growth rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GDP per capita growth rate_90_2015 
government 
spending on 
education (% 
GDP) 90_95 
-0.148*** -0.233*** -0.260*** -0.218*** -0.189*** -0.147** -0.125* -0.121* -0.190*** -0.177** 
 (-3.76) (-3.97) (-4.86) (-3.53) (-3.88) (-2.81) (-2.18) (-2.19) (-4.11) (-2.71) 
quality of 
education 
(Kaarsen) 
95_2011 
 0.570 0.127 1.888** 1.104** 1.263** 1.179** 1.563** 1.060* 0.962 
  (0.89) (0.20) (2.26) (2.54) (2.64) (2.21) (2.26) (2.08) (1.66) 
trade (% GDP) 
1990 
  0.007** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000   
   (2.04) (-0.59) (-0.20) (-0.42) (-0.68) (-0.02)   
aid (% GNI) 1990    -0.004 -0.004 -0.022 -0.032 -0.051* -0.004 -0.008 
    (-0.09) (-0.12) (-1.07) (-1.34) (-1.88) (-0.12) (-0.19) 
investment (% 
GDP) 1990 
    0.083*** 0.093*** 0.079** 0.081** 0.084*** 0.084** 
     (3.08) (3.25) (2.61) (2.44) (3.19) (2.34) 
FDI (% GDP) 
1990 
     0.099 0.138 0.142   
      (0.63) (0.79) (0.80)   
oil rent (% GDP) 
1990 
      -0.011 -0.015   
       (-0.69) (-0.98)   
ICRG IQ 90_2000        -0.430   
        (-0.87)   
East Asia & 
Pacific 
         0.151 
          (0.37) 
Latin          0.304 
          (0.41) 
Sub-Sahara Africa          -0.116 
          (-0.25) 
Obs. 117 56 51 21 21 19 19 19 21 21 
R-sq 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.49 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.72 0.73 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence 
intervals.  
In the following table (Table A.3), we use the logarithm of government spending per student at 
the secondary level schooling (PPP adjusted) instead of government spending on education 
(percentage of GDP). The overall results do not change.  
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Table A3. Education spending per student (secondary level), education quality and long run growth rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GDP per capita growth 1990_2015 
government spending per student (secondary, log 
PPP) -0.207* 
-
1.140*** 
-
0.949*** -0.778** 
-
0.723*** -0.720* -0.453 -0.682 
-
0.889*** 
-
0.878*** 
 (-1.68) (-5.60) (-5.36) (-2.74) (-3.31) (-2.12) (-1.17) (-1.55) (-3.95) (-3.51) 
quality of education (Kaarsen) 95_2011  2.921*** 2.074*** 2.803*** 2.103** 2.360** 1.928** 1.532* 0.976 1.219 
  (3.96) (2.88) (3.32) (2.86) (2.67) (2.45) (2.00) (0.95) (1.01) 
trade (% GDP) 1990   0.007** 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007   
   (2.23) (0.41) (0.33) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.93)   
aid (% GNI) 1990    -0.036 -0.034 -0.019 -0.031 -0.028   
    (-1.03) (-0.82) (-0.32) (-0.71) (-0.70)   
investment (% GDP) 1990     0.054** 0.040 0.022 0.018 0.049** 0.061** 
     (2.32) (1.52) (0.87) (0.85) (2.13) (2.35) 
FDI (% GDP) 1990      0.282 0.259 0.217   
      (1.56) (1.63) (1.32)   
oil rent 8% GDP) 1990       -0.035* -0.024 -0.003 0.007 
       (-1.86) (-1.36) (-0.28) (0.55) 
ICRG IQ 90_2000        0.642* 0.211 0.303 
        (2.19) (0.71) (0.98) 
East Asia & Pacific          0.054 
          (0.12) 
Latin          0.886* 
          (1.86) 
Sub-Sahara          0.568 
          (0.77) 
Obs. 111 53 47 21 21 19 19 19 46 46 
R-sq 0.03 0.38 0.43 0.52 0.62 0.68 0.76 0.80 0.42 0.45 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals. 
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C. Using International database on human capital quality (Altinok and Murseli, 2007) 
Table A4. Education quality and oil rents  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 General Index of Qualitative Indicators of Human Capital (Mathematics, Science and Reading) (Grade 8)- Post 1995 
oil rent (% GDP) -0.507*** -0.536*** -0.528*** -0.501*** -0.500*** -0.507*** -0.382* -0.484* -0.547*** -0.418*** -0.408*** 
 (-3.39) (-4.54) (-4.41) (-4.42) (-4.42) (-3.14) (-1.83) (-2.02) (-2.99) (-2.79) (-3.56) 
log GDP pc  8.761*** 8.672*** 8.686*** 8.702*** 5.276 4.771 5.440 1.611 3.202** 3.857*** 
  (13.36) (13.33) (14.01) (13.78) (1.56) (1.43) (1.63) (0.48) (2.33) (4.91) 
trade (% GDP)   0.014 0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.016 0.025 -0.033 0.007  
   (0.69) (0.21) (0.22) (0.11) (-0.35) (0.59) (-0.81) (0.26)  
FDI (% GDP)    0.343 0.343 1.014** 1.038* -0.076 0.465 -0.124  
    (0.91) (0.91) (2.19) (1.84) (-0.15) (0.86) (-0.28)  
youth 
unem
ploy
ment 
    0.013 -0.187 -0.256 -0.283* -0.125 -0.067  
     (0.07) (-0.98) (-1.57) (-1.76) (-1.30) (-0.75)  
log PPP spending 
per secondary stud. 
     -3.298 1.747 -0.052 0.257   
      (-0.82) (0.42) (-0.01) (0.06)   
log PPP spending 
per primary stud. 
     7.230 -0.999 -1.662 4.082   
      (1.44) (-0.17) (-0.29) (0.66)   
stud_teacher 
secon
dary 
      0.053 -0.057 -0.271 -0.337  
       (0.15) (-0.12) (-0.67) (-1.13)  
stud_teacher 
prima
ry 
      -0.626* -0.640 0.221 0.279  
       (-1.98) (-1.45) (0.50) (1.17)  
ICRG instit. quality        1.940 -2.499 1.425  
        (0.94) (-1.36) (0.96)  
Sub-Sahara         -20.518*** -21.047*** -18.205*** 
         (-4.10) (-4.64) (-5.64) 
Latin         -7.143* -5.789* -4.453 
         (-1.84) (-1.96) (-1.55) 
East Asia & Pacific         7.682* 6.391 7.864** 
         (1.78) (1.53) (2.34) 
EU & Central Asia         8.899*** 7.421*** 8.337*** 
         (2.91) (2.70) (3.35) 
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Obs. 81 81 81 80 80 63 58 55 55 69 81 
R-sq 0.05 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.87 0.85 0.84 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses. Independent variables are average values from 1995 to 2005. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals. 
38 
 
D. Robust regression: examining the effect of outliers or influential observations  
Table A5. Robust regression: Re-examining Model 2.10 from Table 2  
 (1) Model 2.10 (2) Robust regression of Model 2.10 
 quality_education_kaarsen_1995_2011 
oil rent (% GDP) -0.008** -0.009*** 
 (-2.56) (-3.51) 
log GDP pc 0.078** 0.038 
 (2.48) (1.60) 
trade (% GDP) 0.001* 0.002*** 
 (1.72) (5.37) 
FDI (% GDP) -0.006 -0.009** 
 (-1.24) (-2.54) 
youth unemployment 0.001 0.002 
 (0.51) (0.99) 
stud_teacher secondary -0.007 -0.001 
 (-0.99) (-0.16) 
stud_teacher primary 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.56) (-1.18) 
ICRG institutional quality 0.033 0.046 
 (0.84) (1.56) 
Sub-Sahara -0.301** -0.259*** 
 (-2.61) (-2.98) 
Latin -0.059 0.046 
 (-0.49) (0.51) 
East Asia & Pacific 0.187** 0.021 
 (2.28) (0.34) 
EU & Central Asia 0.162** 0.163*** 
 (2.54) (3.38) 
Obs. 61 61 
R-sq 0.73 0.83 
t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.  
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Table A6. Robust regression: Re-examining Model 3.10 from Table 3 
 (1) Model 3.10 (2) Robust regression of Model 3.10 
 WEF_quality_education 2006_2015 
oil rent (% GDP) -0.035*** -0.037*** 
 (-3.91) (-3.75) 
log GDP pc 0.349*** 0.363*** 
 (3.45) (3.26) 
trade (% GDP) 0.003 0.003* 
 (1.58) (1.68) 
FDI (% GDP) 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.02) (-0.05) 
youth unemployment -0.020*** -0.019** 
 (-3.02) (-2.60) 
stud_teacher secondary 0.009 0.010 
 (0.56) (0.57) 
stud_teacher primary -0.010 -0.011 
 (-0.72) (-0.74) 
ICRG institutional quality -0.008 -0.040 
 (-0.06) (-0.29) 
Sub-Sahara -0.012 0.019 
 (-0.04) (0.06) 
Latin -1.023*** -1.051*** 
 (-4.94) (-4.60) 
East Asia & Pacific -0.209 -0.197 
 (-0.89) (-0.76) 
EU & Central Asia -0.399* -0.407* 
 (-1.94) (-1.80) 
Obs. 96 96 
R-sq 0.62 0.58 
t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.  
 
 
